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Abstrat
We study the mehanism-design problem of guaranteeing desirable
performanes whenever agents are rational in the sense of not play-
ing weakly dominated strategies. We rst provide an upper bound
for the best performane we an guarantee among all feasible meha-
nisms. We then prove the bound to be tight under ertain onditions
in aution and bilateral-trade appliations. In partiular, we nd that
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a seond-prie aution is optimal in revenue with interdependent val-
ues, whih is neither dominant-strategy nor ex post inentive ompat-
ible, but satises the novel inentive ompatibility introdued in this
analysis.
1 Introdution
In mehanism design, a typial assumption is that agents play a Bayesian
equilibrium, having a ommon prior over their payo-relevant private infor-
mation. However, these assumptions are sometimes onsidered too strong
and are ritiized in the literature (e.g., Wilson (1987)). For example, in
anonymous online trading environments, the parties may not know eah other
very well, and hene, it may be too demanding to assume that the parties
orretly predit eah other's strategies (in order for them to play a Bayesian
equilibrium), and that they share the same beliefs over their values.
In this paper, we study the problem of designing a mehanism in a more
\robust" manner, so that, even if these assumptions onerning the agents'
possible behaviors or beliefs do not hold, the mehanism an guarantee a
desirable level of performane (e.g., revenue or surplus). More speially,
we onsider a situation where eah agent is rational in the sense that he
does not play any strategy that is weakly dominated,
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but he may play any
strategy that is not weakly dominated (alled an admissible strategy).
2
1
In the literature on deision theory and game theory, admissibility is often onsidered
a reasonable assumption for an individual's \rationality". See, for example, Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986). In the literature on implementation theory, several studies, inluding
Borgers (1991), Jakson (1992), Borgers and Smith (2012b), and Yamashita (2012) exam-
ine implementation in admissible strategies in various ontexts. Note that admissibility
allows only one round of elimination of weakly dominated ations, and in this sense, no
mutual or ommon knowledge of rationality is assumed.
2
For example, they may not play a Bayesian equilibrium, beause an agent may hoose
his strategy as a best response to his onjeture about the opponents' hoies, but the
onjeture may simply be wrong, and hene his atual play may not be a best response to
the others' atual plays.
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Our goal is to haraterize the highest level of performane that an be
guaranteed given whatever admissible strategies are played, and the meha-
nism that ahieves this objetive, whih we refer to as the worst-ase optimal
mehanism. To be spei, we assume that a mehanism designer exists who
has a probability assessment for the agents' payo-relevant private informa-
tion, and who aims to maximize the expeted value of his own utility (e.g.,
revenue or surplus). However, the designer does not know whih admissible
strategy eah agent plays, and therefore, he evaluates eah mehanism a-
ording to his expeted utility that is guaranteed (or the worst ase) among
all the admissible strategy proles of the agents. Suh a \pessimisti" ap-
proah may be reasonable in situations where the agents do not know eah
other very well, or where a mehanism must be designed far in advane so
that it is diÆult to predit the agents' knowledge or beliefs about eah other
at the atual time of playing the mehanism.
One of the main hallenges in this approah is that it is not generally
possible (or at least straightforward) to invoke a revelation priniple in order
to fous on revelation mehanisms in seeking a desirable mehanism.
3
There
is no a priori restrition on the number of messages or their dominane
relations that the desirable mehanism should exhibit, and hene, the opti-
mization problem among all mehanisms ould be intratable. Nevertheless,
we propose a proedure to solve for this optimization problem under ertain
onditions. Our approah is that, instead of attempting to haraterize suh
an optimal mehanism, whih is potentially very ompliated, we rst provide
an upper bound for the highest level of performane that an be guaranteed
among all feasible mehanisms (Theorem 1). An advantage of this approah
is that the upper bound is given by a maximization problem where standard
3
A problem of designing a mehanism where all admissible strategy proles indue
desirable outomes in the sense of guaranteeing ertain performane has a qualitatively
similar feature to a full implementation problem, whih aims to make all possible outomes
desirable in the sense of a soial hoie orrespondene. As in full implementation, a
desirable mehanism is not neessarily a revelation mehanism, but rather may need to
have larger message spaes in order to eliminate some undesirable outomes.
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tehniques developed in the literature ould be appliable. In fat, we ould
interpret the upper-bound problem as maximizing the designer's objetive
among all \revelation mehanisms" that satisfy ertain inentive ompati-
bility, whih, with a ontinuous payo-type spae, indues integral envelope
expressions. In this sense, Theorem 1 may be interpreted as establishing a
version of revelation priniple (not for the highest performane guarantee but
for its upper bound).
Although this upper bound is not neessarily tight, we provide the ondi-
tions under whih the bound is tight, and moreover, the worst-ase optimal
mehanism is haraterized. Preise onditions on primitives that imply the
tight bounds and their interpretations vary aross appliations. Therefore,
in the seond part of the paper, we examine three appliations.
The rst appliation is the worst-ase maximization of a weighted sum
of revenue and surplus in a private-value aution setting. We show that,
under a version of the monotone virtual-value ondition in Myerson (1981),
the upper-bound level of this objetive is guaranteed by a (version of a)
seond-prie aution (Theorem 2), a dominant-strategy inentive-ompatible
mehanism. The observation that desirable mehanisms in a ertain ro-
bustness sense sometimes take the form of dominant-strategy or ex post
inentive-ompatible mehanisms (as in this and our third appliation) ap-
pears in several studies, but in dierent ontexts. For example, Ledyard
(1979), Bergemann and Morris (2005), and Borgers and Smith (2012a) on-
sider implementation of soial hoie funtions or orrespondenes of a par-
tiular lass, while we onsider (worst-ase) maximization of the designer's
objetive funtion. Chung and Ely (2007) onsider revenue maximization in
private-value aution environments, and this study lies loser to our problem
in this respet. We disuss the relationship in greater detail in Setion 4.1.
The seond appliation is revenue maximization in an interdependent-
value aution, and the main result is worst-ase optimality of a (version of
a) seond-prie aution, under a similar ondition as in the rst appliation
(Theorem 3). Although this result is qualitatively similar to the rst appli-
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ation, it has a very dierent interpretation, beause with interdependene,
a seond-prie aution is generally neither dominant-strategy nor ex post in-
entive ompatible. Thus, this is an instane where our upper bound implies
the worst-ase optimal mehanism that is neither dominant-strategy nor ex
post inentive ompatible. In fat, we introdue a novel inentive ondition,
inentive ompatibility for value revelation, whih a seond-prie aution sat-
ises, and we argue that this is a key inentive ondition in our problem with
interdependent values.
We an view this inentive ompatibility for value revelation as a gen-
eralization of dominant-strategy inentive ompatibility in the ontext of
interdependent values, but in a dierent way from ex post inentive ompat-
ibility. In a mehanism that satises this inentive ondition, (i) eah agent
is asked to report his valuation, instead of his payo type, and (ii) the trad-
ing rule is designed so that, if an agent knows his willingness to pay upon
solely observing his payo type, then truth-telling of suh willingness to pay
is weakly dominant. Hene, in a private-value environment, this seond on-
dition immediately implies dominant-strategy inentive ompatibility. How-
ever, in an interdependent-value environment, eah agent may have multiple
admissible messages, depending on his \belief" about the other agents' pay-
o types.
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This new lass of mehanisms ould be useful in more general
\robust" mehanism-design problems with interdependent values, beause,
as Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006) show, in a generi
environment with interdependent values, only a onstant objetive an be ex
post implementable.
5
Conversely, a mehanism with inentive ompatibility
4
To provide an intuition, imagine a bidder in an interdependent-value aution setting
whose private signal indiates that his value for the objet is between one and two. In a
seond-prie aution, any bid below one and above two is weakly dominated (by bidding
one or two), but any bid between one and two may be admissible.
5
Note that there are notable sublasses of nongeneri (but eonomially important)
environments with interdependene where their result does not apply. One of these is
a one-dimensional, single-rossing environment as in Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000). Another is a private-good environment as in Bikhhandani (2006).
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for value revelation, e.g., a seond-prie aution, an \robustly" implement
more nontrivial objetives in suh an environment.
6
The third appliation in the paper is surplus maximization in a (private-
value) bilateral-trade setting (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Hagerty
and Rogerson (1987)). We show that, under a novel ondition, whih we refer
to as the monotone weighted surplus ondition, the upper-bound level of the
expeted surplus is guaranteed by a posted-prie mehanism (Theorem 4). A
posted-prie mehanism sets a trading prie in advane, and the agents trade
if and only if both agree to this prie. This mehanism is learly dominant-
strategy inentive ompatible.
2 Denitions and notation
There is a set of N agents, I = f1; : : : ; Ng. We onsider a quasilinear
setting, inluding autions and bilateral trades as appliations. Speially,
an alloation is denoted by x = (q
i
; p
i
)
i2I
2 X, where q
i
2 R represents
the (one-dimensional) \assignment" to agent i, and p
i
2 R represents his
payment. X may inorporate feasibility onstraints. For example, in an
aution, X = f(q
i
; p
i
)
i2I
j8i; q
i
2 [0; 1℄;
P
i
q
i
 1g.
Eah agent i has a payo-relevant signal 
i
2 
i
, where 
i
is a measurable
spae. We denote a signal prole by  = (
i
)
i2I
2  =
Q
i

i
. Agent
i's valuation for the assignment is v
i
() 2 V
i
= [0; 1℄, whih an vary with

 i
as well as with 
i
, and thus, this environment exhibits interdependent
values. His utility given a signal prole  and an alloation x = (q
i
; p
i
)
i2I
is
u
i
(x; ) = v
i
()q
i
  p
i
.
Even though the alloation is one-dimensional for eah agent, it does not
mean that 
i
must also be one-dimensional. For example, in an aution of
6
The idea that some mehanisms that are not ex post inentive ompatible may still
ahieve desirable outomes in a ertain robustness sense appears in Jehiel, Moldovanu,
Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006) and Meyer-ter-Vehn and Morris (2011). In this paper,
we also identify a neessary ondition for implementable objetives in a lass of problems
in the form of an upper bound for the performane level we an potentially guarantee.
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an oil trat, agent i's signal may be two-dimensional, say 
i
= (
i
; d
i
) 2 R
2
,
where 
i
is a noisy signal of the amount of oil in the trat, and d
i
is an
idiosynrati omponent, suh as the ost of digging the well, rening the
oil, et. Then, i's value may be given by v
i
() = 
i
(
1
; : : : ; 
N
) + d
i
with
an inreasing funtion 
i
() representing the estimated amount of oil in the
trat for eah signal prole.
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Given agent i's signal 
i
, let V
i
(
i
) = fv
i
()j
 i
2 
 i
g denote the set
of i's possible valuations given 
i
. Throughout the paper, we assume that
V
i
(
i
) is a ompat interval. We say that an environment is a private-value
environment if, for all i, we have 
i
= V
i
and V
i
(v
i
) = fv
i
g for eah v
i
2 V
i
.
The designer has a utility funtion w : X   ! R. For example, for
revenue maximization, we have w(x; ) =
P
i
p
i
, and for surplus maximiza-
tion, we have w(x; ) =
P
i
v
i
()q
i
. He also has a prior distribution over ,
denoted by  2 (). However, we do not assume that the agents share
the same prior. Rather, eah agent may have a very dierent prior from the
designer (and from the other agents).
A mehanism is denoted by   = hM; gi, where eah M
i
is agent i's
message spae, M =
Q
i
M
i
, and g : M ! X is an outome funtion. Given
a message prole m = (m
i
)
i2I
2 M , we denote the indued alloation by
g(m) = (q
g
i
(m); p
g
i
(m))
i2I
. A mehanism is feasible if eahM
i
(i) is nite, and
(ii) ontains a message that orresponds to \opt-out" or \nonpartiipation",
m
out
, suh that q
g
i
(m
out
; m
 i
) = p
g
i
(m
out
; m
 i
) = 0 for any m
 i
2M
 i
.
8
In any given mehanism, eah agent i of type 
i
may play any message
that is admissible (i.e., not weakly dominated) in a mehanism.
7
As in Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006), a \robustness" onept
in the literature, namely ex post implementation, has a very limited set of implementable
objetives in suh a multidimensional, interdependent-value environment.
8
Some mehanisms disussed in this paper, suh as a (ontinuous-version of a) seond-
prie aution, violate the niteness, and hene, is infeasible. However, whenever we laim
that suh a mehanism is \optimal", we identify a sequene of feasible mehanisms that
onverges (in an appropriate sense) to suh a mehanism, and in this sense, we treat suh
a mehanism as \approximately" feasible. See Setion 4.1 and 4.2 for the detail.
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Denition 1. In a mehanism   = hM; gi, a message m
i
2M
i
is admissible
for 
i
, if there exists some 
 i
2 
 i
suh that no message weakly dominates
m
i
if the agent's value is v
i
(
i
; 
 i
), i.e., there is no m
0
i
2M
i
that satises (i)
u
i
(g(m
0
i
; m
 i
); 
i
; 
 i
)  u
i
(g(m
i
; m
 i
); 
i
; 
 i
) for any m
 i
2 M
 i
, and (ii)
u
i
(g(m
0
i
; m
 i
); 
i
; 
 i
) > u
i
(g(m
i
; m
 i
); 
i
; 
 i
) for some m
 i
2M
 i
.
Beause i's preferene an vary with 
 i
, a message m
i
is said to be
admissible for 
i
if m
i
is not weakly dominated given some 
 i
. The impliit
idea is that i may possess any \belief" for 
 i
and m
 i
2 M
 i
. Thus, many
messages may be admissible for 
i
, espeially when V
i
(
i
) is large.
We denote by M
A
i
(
i
) M
i
the set of all admissible messages for 
i
, and
by M
A
() =
Q
i
M
A
i
(
i
) the set of all admissible message proles in state .
We evaluate a mehanism aording to its guaranteed performane level
given whatever admissible strategies are played. In this sense, we assume that
the designer is unertainty-averse with respet to the agents' (admissible)
strategies.
Denition 2. The performane guarantee of a mehanism   = hM; gi is
W ( ) =
Z

h
min
m2M
A
()
w(g(m); )
i
d:
The main goal of this paper is to haraterize the highest performane
guarantee among all feasible mehanisms, i.e., sup
 
W ( ), under ertain on-
ditions.
3 An upper bound for the performane guar-
antee
One of the main hallenges is that it is not generally possible (or at least
straightforward) to invoke a revelation priniple in order to fous on revela-
tion mehanisms in seeking a desirable mehanism.
9
Beause there is no a
9
In the sense that we aim to design a mehanism where all admissible strategy proles
indue desirable outomes (in the sense of guaranteeing ertain performanes), it has a
8
priori restrition on the number of messages or their dominane relations that
the desirable mehanism should exhibit, the optimization problem among all
mehanisms ould be intratable.
Instead of attempting to haraterize suh a potentially ompliated op-
timal mehanism, we therefore rst provide an upper bound for sup
 
W ( ).
Theorem 1. For any mehanism  ,
W ( )  W = sup
f=(q;p):V!X
Z

h
inf
v2V ()
w(f(v); )
i
d
sub:to v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
) d~v
i
; 8i; v:
Therefore, W is an upper bound for sup
 
W ( ). We prove the theorem
in Setion 3.1. In the remainder of this setion, we provide an informal
interpretation of this result. We rst onsider the private-value ase, and
then the interdependent-value ase.
With private values (i.e., 
i
= V
i
for eah i, and V
i
(v
i
) = fv
i
g for eah
v
i
2 V
i
; see page 7), the upper bound has a simpler expression, as follows.
Corollary 1. Assume that 
i
= V
i
for eah i, and that V
i
(v
i
) = fv
i
g for
eah v
i
2 V
i
. For any mehanism  ,
W ( )  W
PV
= sup
f=(q;p):V!X
Z
v
w(f(v); v)d
sub:to v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
) d~v
i
; 8i; v:
qualitatively similar feature to a full implementation problem. As in full implementation,
a desirable mehanism is not neessarily a revelation mehanism, but rather may need to
have larger message spaes in order to eliminate some undesirable outomes. However,
ontrary to the popular approah in the literature on full implementation, our result does
not rely on the use of mehanisms with \integer-game" or \tail-hasing" strutures (see
Jakson (1991), Abreu and Matsushima (1992)) beause only nite mehanisms are feasible
in our setup.
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Note that f = (q; p) : V ! X is an alloation rule or a revelation meh-
anism in a standard sense. The objetive,
R
v
w(f(v); v)d, is the designer's
expeted utility given that the agents report their values truthfully. The
onstraint is, as shown in the proof, obtained by the \loal and downward"
inentive ompatibility of the following kind: if agent i has value v
i
2 V
i
,
then he would not be better o by pretending to have a slightly lower value
than v
i
, regardless of the other agents' hoies. In other words, the onstraint
is a \partial" inentive ondition for truth-telling being weakly dominant. In
this sense, we may interpret this result as a sort of revelation priniple (not
for sup
 
W ( ) but for its upper bound) based on the loal and downward
inentive ompatibility.
Theorem 1 (or Corollary 1) would be most useful when the upper bound
is in fat a tight bound, i.e., sup
 
W ( ) = W
PV
. In Setion 4, in a private-
value aution (Setion 4.1) and in bilateral trade (Setion 4.3), we provide
suÆient onditions for eah of these appliations under whih the solution,
say f

, to the upper-bound problem given in Corollary 1 has the property
that M
A
i
() = f
i
g for every i and for (-)almost every 
i
, i.e., truth-telling
is the only admissible message. With a aveat treated more formally in
Setion 4, this suggests that the truth-telling performane,
R
v
w(f

(v); v)d,
is guaranteed in the revelation mehanism f

, and hene, the worst-ase
optimality of f

(and the tightness of the bound) is implied.
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Now we onsider the interdependent-value ase. Reall that
W = sup
f=(q;p):V!X
Z

h
inf
v2V ()
w(f(v); )
i
d
sub:to v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
)d~v
i
; 8i; v:
Here, f is no longer an alloation rule or a revelation mehanism in a
10
The aveat is that f

is not neessarily a feasible mehanism beause it may have
innitely many messages, e.g., a seond-prie aution in Setion 4.1. In that ase, we
onstrut a sequene of feasible mehanisms, f 
k
g
1
k=1
, suh that their performane guar-
antees onverge to that of f

, i.e., lim
k!1
W ( 
k
) =
R
v
w(f

(v); v)d, and we interpret
f

as \approximately" feasible.
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standard sense, beause the domain of f is V , rather than . Nevertheless,
we an interpret f in an analogous way as in the private-value ase.
To see this, we rst introdue the following novel inentive ompatibility
ondition.
Denition 3. f = (q; p) : V ! X is inentive ompatible for value revelation
(in admissible strategies) if, for eah i and 
i
2 
i
, we have M
A
i
(
i
) = V
i
(
i
).
Suppose that the designer uses this \value-revelation" mehanism f that
is inentive ompatible for value revelation. For agent i with 
i
, for any
report v
0
i
outside his possible values V
i
(
i
), there is another report v
i
2 V
i
(
i
)
that is always better than v
0
i
regardless of the others' signals 
 i
and the
others' reports v
 i
. By abuse of terminology, any report v
i
2 V
i
(
i
) is said to
be truthful, and any report v
0
i
=2 V
i
(
i
) is said to be untruthful. The onept
of inentive ompatibility for value revelation has a similar spirit as that of
dominant-strategy inentive ompatibility in that any untruthful reports are
weakly dominated.
If eah agent i with 
i
never reports v
0
i
=2 V
i
(
i
), then the designer's
expeted utility in this value-revelation mehanism is at least
Z

h
inf
v2V ()
w(f(v); )
i
d:
As in the private-value ase, the onstraint of the upper-bound problem
an be interpreted as \partial" inentive ompatibility onditions: if agent
i knows (or believes) that his value is v
i
2 V
i
for sure, then he would not
be better o by pretending to have a slightly lower value than v
i
. In this
sense, we may interpret Theorem 1 as a sort of revelation priniple (not
for sup
 
W ( ) but for its upper bound) based on the loal and downward
inentive ompatibility for value revelation.
In the next setion, in an interdependent-value aution (Setion 4.2), we
provide suÆient onditions under whih the solution f

to the upper-bound
problem is inentive ompatible for value revelation. With the same aveat as
in the private-value ase, this suggests that the truth-telling performane is
11
guaranteed in the value-revelation mehanism f

, and hene, the worst-ase
optimality of f

(and the tightness of the bound) is implied.
11
3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
This subsetion is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.
Fix an arbitrary feasible mehanism   = hM; gi. For eah i, let
~

i
=

i
[V
i
be an augmented set of agent i's types, suh that eah type v
i
2 V
i
has
V
i
(v
i
) = fv
i
g and is alled a private-value type. The designer's prior assigns
() = 1. Augmenting the type spae is useful in simplifying the proof,
but the result holds true even without the augmentation. In the mehanism
 , for eah v
i
2 V
i
, let M
A
i
(v
i
) denote the set of admissible messages for
private-value type v
i
.
The proof onsists of several lemmas. The rst lemma shows a onnetion
between the set of admissible messages for 
i
and that for eah private-value
type v
i
suh that v
i
2 V
i
(
i
).
Lemma 1. For eah i and 
i
2 
i
, we have M
A
i
(
i
) 
S
v
i
2V
i
(
i
)
M
A
i
(v
i
).
Proof. Let v
i
2 V
i
(
i
). By assumption, there exists 
 i
suh that v
i
=
v
i
(
i
; 
 i
). Then, eah m
i
2 M
A
i
(v
i
) is admissible for 
i
as well. There-
fore, M
A
i
(
i
)  M
A
i
(v
i
). Beause v
i
is arbitrary, we obtain M
A
i
(
i
) 
S
v
i
2V
i
(
i
)
M
A
i
(v
i
).
As an impliation of niteness of  , for eah i, V
i
= [0; 1℄ is nitely
partitioned into fV
k
i
g
K
k=1
so that any two types v
i
; v
0
i
2 V
k
i
have the same
ordinal preferene over fg(m)jm 2Mg. This implies thatM
A
i
(v
i
) = M
A
i
(v
0
i
).
Also, eah V
k
i
is onneted, as in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For eah i; k, if v
i
; v
0
i
2 V
k
i
, then for any  2 (0; 1), v
i
+ (1  
)v
0
i
2 V
k
i
.
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Again, the aveat is that f

is not neessarily feasible beause it may have innitely
many messages. In that ase, we onstrut a sequene of feasible mehanisms, f 
k
g
1
k=1
,
suh that their performane guarantees onverge to that of f

, i.e., lim
k!1
W ( 
k
) =
R
v
w(f

(v); v)d.
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Proof. Let (q; p); (q
0
; p
0
) 2 fg(m)jm 2 Mg. For v
i
; v
0
i
2 V
k
i
, without loss of
generality, we assume
v
i
q
i
  p
i
 v
i
q
0
i
  p
0
i
;
v
0
i
q
i
  p
i
 v
0
i
q
0
i
  p
0
i
:
This implies that, for  2 (0; 1),
(v
i
+ (1  )v
0
i
)q
i
  p
i
 (v
i
+ (1  )v
0
i
)q
0
i
  p
0
i
;
and thus, v
i
+ (1  )v
0
i
2 V
k
i
.
We assume V
k
i
 V
k+1
i
(in a natural set order) for eah k without loss
of generality. Let v
k
i
= inf V
k
i
. Note that v
1
i
= 0. The next lemma is also
immediate given the niteness of  .
Lemma 3. For eah i, v
i
2 V
i
, and m
i
2 M
i
, there exists m
0
i
2M
A
i
(v
i
) suh
that, for any m
 i
2M
 i
,
v
i
q
g
i
(m
0
i
; m
 i
)  p
g
i
(m
0
i
; m
 i
)  v
i
q
g
i
(m
i
; m
 i
)  p
g
i
(m
i
; m
 i
):
Proof. We have either m
i
2M
A
i
(v
i
) or m
i
=2M
A
i
(v
i
).
If m
i
2 M
A
i
(v
i
), let m
0
i
= m
i
. Then, the inequality is satised with
equality for any m
 i
2M
 i
.
If m
i
=2 M
A
i
(v
i
), then m
i
is weakly dominated by some m
0
i
2 M
A
i
(v
i
)
beauseM
i
is nite. Thus, m
0
i
satises the inequality for any m
 i
2M
 i
.
For eah i, take an arbitrary sequene of private-value types, fv
1
i
; : : : ; v
K
i
g,
suh that, for k = 1; : : : ; K   1, v
k
i
2 V
k
i
. First, let m
0
i
= m
out
2 M
i
,
where m
out
is the message orresponding to \nonpartiipation". For eah
k = 1; : : : ; K
i
, given m
k 1
i
, the previous lemma implies that there is m
k
i
2
M
A
i
(v
k
i
) suh that, for any m
 i
,
v
k
i
q
g
i
(m
k
i
; m
 i
)  p
g
i
(m
k
i
; m
 i
)  v
k
i
q
g
i
(m
k 1
i
; m
 i
)  p
g
i
(m
k 1
i
; m
 i
):
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Moreover, for any v
i
2 V
k
i
and m
 i
, we have
v
i
q
g
i
(m
k
i
; m
 i
)  p
g
i
(m
k
i
; m
 i
)  v
i
q
g
i
(m
k 1
i
; m
 i
)  p
g
i
(m
k 1
i
; m
 i
);
whih implies, by ontinuity,
v
k
i
q
g
i
(m
k
i
; m
 i
)  p
g
i
(m
k
i
; m
 i
)  v
k
i
q
g
i
(m
k 1
i
; m
 i
)  p
g
i
(m
k 1
i
; m
 i
):
Dene f = (q; p) : V ! X so that, if v = (v
i
)
i2I
2
Q
i
V
k
i
i
for some
k
1
; : : : ; k
N
, then
(q(v); p(v)) = (q
g
((m
k
i
i
)
i2I
); p
g
((m
k
i
i
)
i2I
)):
Reall that, for eah i and 
i
, we have M
A
i
(
i
) 
S
v
i
2V
i
(
i
)
M
A
i
(v
i
). Thus,
W ( ) 
Z

h
inf
v2V ()
w(f(v); )
i
d:
We omplete the proof by showing the desired integral envelope ondition.
Lemma 4. For eah i, v
i
2 V
i
, v
 i
2 V
 i
,
v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
) d~v
i
:
Proof. For an arbitrary k = (k
1
; : : : ; k
N
), let v
i
2 V
k
i
i
. We only show the
desired inequality for agent 1.
v
1
q
1
(v
1
; : : : ; v
N
)  t
1
(v
1
; : : : ; v
N
)
= v
1
q
g
1
(m
k
1
1
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
)  p
g
1
(m
k
1
1
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
)
= (v
1
  v
k
1
1
)q
g
1
(m
k
1
1
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
) + v
k
1
1
q
g
1
(m
k
1
1
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
)  p
g
1
(m
k
1
1
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
)
 (v
1
  v
k
1
1
)q
g
1
(m
k
1
1
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
) + v
k
1
1
q
g
1
(m
k
1
 1
1
; m
k
2
2
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
)  p
g
1
(m
k
1
 1
1
; m
k
2
2
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
)
 (v
1
  v
k
1
1
)q
g
1
(m
k
1
1
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
) +
k
1
X
j
1
=2
(v
j
1
1
  v
j
1
 1
1
)q
g
1
(m
j
1
 1
1
; m
k
2
2
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
)
+v
1
1
q
g
1
(m
1
1
; m
k
2
2
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
)  p
g
1
(m
1
1
; m
k
2
2
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
)
 (v
1
  v
k
1
1
)q
g
1
(m
k
1
1
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
) +
k
1
X
j
1
=2
(v
j
1
1
  v
j
1
 1
1
)q
g
1
(m
j
1
 1
1
; m
k
2
2
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
):
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Observe that
(v
1
  v
k
1
1
)q
g
1
(m
k
1
1
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
) =
Z
v
1
v
k
1
1
q
1
(~v
1
; v
 1
)d~v
1
;
and for eah j
1
= 2; : : : ; k
1
,
(v
j
1
1
  v
j
1
 1
1
)q
g
1
(m
j
1
 1
1
; m
k
2
2
; : : : ; m
k
N
N
) =
Z
v
j
1
1
v
j
1
 1
1
q
1
(~v
1
; v
 1
)d~v
1
;
and therefore, realling v
1
1
= 0,
v
1
q
1
(v)  p
1
(v) 
Z
v
1
0
q
1
(~v
1
; v
 1
)d~v
1
:
We have shown that, given any  , there exists f = (q; p) suh that
W ( ) 
Z

h
inf
v2intV ()
w(f(v); )
i
d;
and for eah i, v
i
, v
 i
,
v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
) d~v
i
:
Therefore, for any  ,
W ( )  W = sup
f=(q;p):V!X
Z

h
inf
v2V ()
w(f(v); )
i
d
sub:to v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
) d~v
i
; 8i; v:
4 Appliations
In this setion, we onsider three appliations: a private-value aution, an
interdependent-value aution, and private-value bilateral trade. Under er-
tain onditions in eah of these appliations, we show that the upper bound
haraterized in Theorem 1 is tight, and obtain the worst-ase optimal meh-
anism.
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4.1 Private-value aution
As the rst appliation, we onsider an aution environment with private
values (i.e., 
i
= V
i
for eah i, and V
i
(v
i
) = fv
i
g for eah v
i
), where the
designer's objetive is a weighted sum of revenue and surplus. For  2 [0; 1℄,
let
w((q
i
; p
i
)
i2I
; v) = 
 
X
i
p
i
!
+ (1  )
 
X
i
v
i
q
i
!
:
By Theorem 1 (or Corollary 1), an upper bound for the highest perfor-
mane guarantee is
W = sup
(q;p):V!X
Z
v

 
X
i
p
i
(v)
!
+ (1  )
 
X
i
v
i
q
i
(v)
!
d
sub:to v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
) d~v
i
; 8i; v:
We assume a generalized version of the \regularity" onditions of Myerson
(1981) as in the following Assumptions 1{3.
12
Assumption 1. (full-support density)  is absolutely ontinuous (with re-
spet to a Lebesgue measure on R
N
) with a density  with (v) > 0 for all
v 2 V .
Let 
i
() denote the marginal density for v
i
, and for eah v
 i
, let 
i
(jv
 i
)
denote the onditional density for v
i
given v
 i
. Let 
i
() and 
i
(jv
 i
) denote
their CDFs.
Let h
i
(v) = v
i
  
1 
i
(v
i
jv
 i
)

i
(v
i
jv
 i
)
denote the virtual value of agent i given v.
Assumption 2. (symmetry) For eah v and its permutation v
0
(i.e., there
exists a bijetion  : I ! I suh that v
i
= v
0
(i)
for eah i), we have (v) =
(v
0
).
Assumption 3. (monotone virtual values) For eah i and v, h
i
(v) is stritly
inreasing in v
i
, and noninreasing in v
 i
.
12
See Segal (2003) and Chung and Ely (2007).
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When v is independently distributed aording to the designer's prior, this
ondition orresponds to the monotone virtual-value ondition in Myerson
(1981). As in Chung and Ely (2007), if v is aÆliated in the sense of Milgrom
and Weber (1982), then the ondition is also satised. Given i and v
 i
, let
r

i
(v
 i
) = inffv
i
jh
i
(v
i
; v
 i
) > 0g (let r

i
(v
 i
) = 1 if the set on the right-hand
side is empty). By Assumption 3, suh r

i
(v
 i
) uniquely exists for eah i
and v
 i
, and is nondereasing in v
 i
, whih implies that r

i
is ontinuous at
almost every v
 i
.
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By Assumption 2, r

i
() = r

j
() for eah i; j, and hene,
we denote this by r

() in the following.
A seond-prie aution with a reserve-prie funtion r

() is a revelation
mehanism f = (q; p) : V ! X suh that, for eah i and v, (i) q
i
(v) = 1
if and only if v
i
> v
(1)
 i
= max
j 6=i
v
j
and v
i
> r

(v
 i
), and (ii) p
i
(v) =
q
i
(v)  maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g. This is dominant-strategy inentive ompatible,
and the designer's expeted utility under the agents' truth-telling an be
written as follows.
X
i
Z
vjv
i
>maxfv
(1)
 i
;r

(v
 i
)g
h
maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g+ (1  )v
i
i
d:
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, we have
W =
X
i
Z
vjv
i
>maxfv
(1)
 i
;r

(v
 i
)g
h
maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g+ (1  )v
i
i
d:
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the onstraints are
satised with equality (otherwise we an inrease the payment from the or-
responding agent without dereasing the objetive). Then, by a standard
proedure based on integration by parts,
W = sup
q:V!X
Z
v
X
i

(v
i
q
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
)d~v
i
) + (1  )v
i
q
i
(v)

d
= sup
q:V!X
Z
v
X
i

v
i
  
1  
i
(v
i
jv
 i
)

i
(v
i
jv
 i
)

q
i
(v) d
= sup
q:V!X
Z
v
X
i
h
i
(v)q
i
(v) d:
13
See Lavri (1993) for the proof.
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Thus, the pointwise maximization of
P
i
h
i
(v)q
i
(v) implies that the so-
lution to the right-hand side problem is q

(v) suh that q

i
(v) = 1 if v
i
>
maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g, and q

i
(v) = 0 if v
i
< maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g. Therefore,
W =
X
i
Z
vjv
i
>maxfv
(1)
 i
;r

(v
 i
)g
h
maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g+ (1  )v
i
i
d:
If the seond-prie aution with a reserve-prie funtion r

() is feasible,
then this lemma would be the desired tight-bound result. However, we do not
onsider this feasible in this paper, beause it has innitely many messages.
Nevertheless, we an nd a sequene of feasible mehanisms, denoted by
f 
K
g
1
K=1
, that onverges to this mehanism in an appropriate sense, and
hene, we treat this seond-prie aution as \approximately" feasible.
Speially, dene  
K
= hM
K
; (q
K
; p
K
)i as a nite version of a seond-
prie aution suh that for eah i, (i) M
K
i
= f
k
K
jk = 0; : : : ; Kg, and (ii) for
eah v 2M
K
, (q
K
i
(v); p
K
i
(v)) = (1;maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g) if v
i
> maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g,
and q
K
i
(v) = p
K
i
(v) = 0 otherwise.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3,
lim
K!1
W ( 
K
) =W;
whih, in partiular, implies sup
 
W ( ) =W .
Proof. Fix K 2 N , and onsider the mehanism  
K
. For eah i and v
i
2 V
i
,
let V
i
(v
i
) be the maximum of
k
K
, k = 1; : : : ; K, suh that
k
K
 v
i
, and V
i
(v
i
)
be the minimum of
k
K
, k = 1; : : : ; K, suh that
k
K
 v
i
. Obviously, in this
mehanism  
K
, M
A
i
(v
i
) = fV
i
(v
i
); V
i
(v
i
)g, and therefore, given whatever
admissible messages are played, agent i wins for sure in state v if v
i
 
1
K
>
v
(1)
 i
+
1
K
and v
i
 
1
K
> r

(V
 i
(v
 i
)), where V
 i
(v
 i
) = (V
j
(v
j
))
j 6=i
.
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Thus,  
K
guarantees
W ( 
K
) =
Z
v
min
m2M
A
(v)
"

 
X
i
p
K
i
(m)
!
+ (1  )
 
X
i
v
i
q
K
i
(m)
!#
d

Z
v

 
min
m2M
A
(v)
X
i
p
K
i
(m)
!
+ (1  )
 
min
m2M
A
(v)
X
i
v
i
q
K
i
(m)
!
d

X
i
Z

v


v
i
 
1
K
>maxfv
(1)
 i
+
1
K
;r

(V
 i
(v
 i
))g




maxfv
(1)
 i
+
1
K
; r

(V
 i
(v
 i
))g

+ (1  )v
i

d:
Beause r

is ontinuous at almost every v
 i
, for eah " > 0, there exists
K(") suh that, for any K > K("),
W ( 
K
) 
X
i
Z
vjv
i
>maxfv
(1)
 i
;r

(v
 i
)g
h


maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g

+ (1  )v
i
i
d  "
= W   ":
Therefore,
lim
K!1
W ( 
K
) =W:
For revenue maximization (i.e.,  = 1), the result is qualitatively similar
to Theorem 1 in Chung and Ely (2007) (\maxmin foundation" of a dominant-
strategy aution), although we use dierent solution onepts: they onsider
Bayesian implementation with a universal type spae (Mertens and Zamir
(1985)), while we onsider admissible strategies.
14
Despite the dierenes,
there appears to be some oneptual relationship in our arguments. Very
14
At a more tehnial level, they onsider a nite value spae with single-rossing virtual
values, while we onsider a ontinuous value spae with monotone virtual values. Neither
result implies the other.
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roughly, in their Bayesian inentive-ompatible mehanism, for eah payo-
type of eah agent, Chung and Ely (2007) identify a belief type whose inen-
tive ompatibility is binding. Then, they show that the optimal mehanism
under these (Bayesian) inentive ompatibility onditions is equivalent to
that under dominant-strategy inentive ompatibility. In our framework, for
eah payo type of eah agent, we identify an inentive ondition implied
by admissibility, and show that the optimal mehanism under this set of
inentive onditions is equivalent to that under dominant-strategy inentive
ompatibility.
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4.2 Interdependent-value aution
The seond appliation is an interdependent-value aution, where the de-
signer's objetive is revenue, i.e.,
w((q
i
; p
i
)
i2I
; ) =
X
i
p
i
:
By Theorem 1, the upper bound for the highest expeted revenue we an
guarantee is
W = sup
(q;p):V!X
Z

h
inf
v2V ()
X
i
p
i
(v)
i
d
sub:to v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
) d~v
i
; 8i; v:
Let V
i
(
i
) = minV
i
(
i
) denote the minimum possible valuation that agent
i with signal 
i
ould possess, among all 
 i
. We then obtain another upper
15
Yamashita (2013b) further examines the formal relationship between Bayesian meha-
nism design with \large" type spaes (as in Chung and Ely (2007), Bergemann and Morris
(2005), Borgers and Smith (2012a)) and mehanism design with admissible strategies. In
general, those two approahes yield a similar set of implementable objetives in private-
value environments, but not generally in interdependent-value environments.
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bound, W
0
, that is (weakly) even higher than W :
W
0
= sup
(q;p):V!X
Z

X
i
p
i
(V ())d
sub:to v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
) d~v
i
; 8i; v:
Intuitively,
R

P
i
p
i
(V ())d represents the expeted revenue in a value-
revelation mehanism (q; p) under truth-telling behavior when eah i of 
i
believes that his value is V
i
(
i
).
Let 	 denote the probability distribution over V suh that, for eah
measurable E  V , 	(E) = (fjV () 2 Eg). That is, 	 is the probability
measure over the minimum possible values of the agents indued by . Then,
we have
Z

X
i
p
i
(V ())d =
Z
v
X
i
p
i
(v)d	;
and therefore,
W
0
= sup
(q;p):V!X
Z
v
X
i
p
i
(v)d	
sub:to v
i
q
i
(v)  p
i
(v) 
Z
v
i
0
q
i
(~v
i
; v
 i
) d~v
i
; 8i; v:
We an interpret this problem as a revenue-maximization problem in
a private-value setting. Thus, similar onditions as found in the previous
setion are useful for haraterizing the worst-ase optimal mehanism.
Assumption 4. (full-support density) 	 is absolutely ontinuous (with re-
spet to a Lebesgue measure on R
N
) with a density  with  (v) > 0 for all
v 2 V .
Let  
i
() denote the marginal density for v
i
, and for eah v
 i
, let  
i
(jv
 i
)
denote the onditional density for v
i
given v
 i
. Let 	
i
() and 	
i
(jv
 i
) denote
their CDFs.
Let h
i
(v) = v
i
 
1 	
i
(v
i
jv
 i
)
 
i
(v
i
jv
 i
)
denote the virtual value of agent i given v.
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Assumption 5. (symmetry) For eah v and its permutation v
0
, we have
 (v) =  (v
0
).
Assumption 6. (monotone virtual values) For eah i and v, h
i
(v) is stritly
inreasing in v
i
, and noninreasing in v
 i
.
For eah i and v
 i
, let r

i
(v
 i
) = inffv
i
jh
i
(v
i
; v
 i
) > 0g, or one if the set
on the right-hand side is empty. By Assumption 6, suh r

i
(v
 i
) uniquely
exists for eah i and v
 i
, and is nondereasing in v
 i
(and hene ontinuous
at almost every v
 i
). By Assumption 5, r

i
() = r

j
() for eah i; j, and hene,
we denote it by r

() in the following.
As in the previous setion, a seond-prie aution with a reserve-prie
funtion r

() guarantees the upper-bound level of expeted revenue, W
0
,
whih is approximated by a sequene of nite versions of seond-prie au-
tions.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 4, 5, and 6, we have
lim
K!1
W ( 
K
) =W =
X
i
Z
vjv
i
>maxfv
(1)
 i
;r

(v
 i
)g
maxfv
(1)
 i
; r

(v
 i
)g d	;
whih in partiular imply sup
 
W ( ) = W .
We omit the proof beause it is immediate from Lemma 5 and Theorem
2 with  = 1.
Although the result is qualitatively similar to the rst appliation to
private-value autions, it has a quite dierent interpretation, beause a seond-
prie aution is generally neither dominant-strategy nor ex-post inentive
ompatible with interdependent values. In fat, the result suggests that the
new lass of inentive onditions identied in this paper, namely inentive
ompatibility for value revelation, plays a key role in understanding the high-
est performane guarantee in interdependent-value settings.
Another dierene from the private-value ase is that Assumptions 4{
6 are on the distribution of the minimum possible valuations V (), rather
than on  or the atual valuation funtions v(). For example, let 
i
=
22
(
i
; d
i
) 2 
i
 R
2
be i's two-dimensional signal, and v
i
() = 
i
() + d
i
be i's
valuation funtion. Reall that 
i
is a ommon omponent and d
i
is a private
omponent. Suppose that, for eah i and 
i
, min

 i

i
(
i
; 
 i
) = 0 (hene
nonnegative interdependene). Then, i's minimum possible value given 
i
is V
i
(
i
) = d
i
, and thus, 	 is simply the marginal distribution of  over
the private omponents of the agents. In this ase, for Theorem 3 to hold
true, we do not need any assumption on the distribution over the ommon
omponents.
4.3 Private-value bilateral trade
The third appliation is surplus maximization in private-value bilateral trade
(Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Hagerty and Rogerson (1987)). Spei-
ally, let I = f1; 2g, where i = 1 is a seller and i = 2 is a buyer. For eah i,

i
= V
i
, and for eah v
i
2 V
i
, V
i
(v
i
) = fv
i
g.
Let (q; p) 2 [0; 1℄R represent the trade alloation, where q is the proba-
bility that the seller provides the good to the buyer, and p is the payment from
the buyer to the seller. The seller's utility given (q; p) 2 X is p  v
1
q (hene,
v
1
may be interpreted as the seller's opportunity ost), and the buyer's utility
given (q; p) is v
2
q   p.
Note that this notation is onsistent with that introdued in Setion 2.
Speially, in the model introdued in Setion 2, let X = f(q
i
; p
i
)
i2I
jq
2
=
 q
1
2 [0; 1℄; p
2
=  p
1
2 Rg be the set of feasible alloations. Then, the
seller's utility is v
1
q
1
  p
1
= p
2
  v
1
q
2
and the buyer's utility is v
2
q
2
  p
2
.
By identifying (q
2
; p
2
) as (q; p), we obtain the bilateral-trade model in this
subsetion.
The designer's objetive is surplus, i.e.,
w((q; p); ) = (v
2
  v
1
)q:
By Theorem 1, the upper bound for the highest expeted surplus we an
23
guarantee is
W = sup
(q;p):V!X
Z
v
(v
2
  v
1
)q(v) d
sub:to p(v)  v
1
q(v) 
Z
1
v
1
q(~v
1
; v
2
) d~v
1
; 8v;
v
2
q(v)  p(v) 
Z
v
2
0
q(v
1
; ~v
2
) d~v
2
; 8v:
As opposed to the aution environments, a feasible alloation has to sat-
isfy the budget-balane ondition, and hene, it is not obvious whether the
solution to the upper-bound problem satises all the onstraints with equal-
ity.
In the following, we introdue a suÆient ondition for the environment
under whih the solution to the upper-bound problem is dominant-strategy
inentive ompatible.
Assumption 7. (monotone weighted surplus)  is absolutely ontinuous
(with respet to a Lebesgue measure on R
2
) with a density . For any v
1
< v
2
,
(v)  (v
2
  v
1
)(v) is stritly dereasing in v
1
and stritly inreasing in v
2
.
(v) quanties the impat on expeted surplus of making the agents trade,
or in other words, it is the trade surplus in state v weighted by the density
of the state, (v). The monotoniity of the weighted surplus  in ( v
1
; v
2
)
means that more-eÆient types (i.e., lower v
1
and higher v
2
) have higher
impats on expeted surplus.
For example, the ondition is satised if (i) more eÆient types are more
likely, i.e., the density (v) is noninreasing in v
1
and nondereasing in v
2
,
or if (ii)  is dierentiable and the rate of hange in  is suÆiently small so
that, for any v,



(v)=v
1
(v)=(1 v
1
)



;



(v)=v
2
(v)=v
2



< 1.
16
16
We measure the frational hange in the seller's type with respet to the highest-ost
type, so we have 1  v
1
instead of v
1
in the denominator. The ondition is satised for a
lass of ommon distributions under appropriate trunation and restritions on parameter
values.
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A posted-prie mehanism with prie r 2 [0; 1℄ is a revelation meha-
nism (q; p) : V ! X suh that (q(v); p(v)) = (1; r) if v
2
> r > v
1
, and
(q(v); p(v)) = (0; 0) otherwise. It is dominant-strategy inentive ompati-
ble,
17
and it guarantees the following expeted surplus.
Z
r
v
1
=0
Z
1
v
2
=r
(v) dv
2
dv
1
:
Observe that, under Assumption 7, this is stritly onvex in r. Thus,
the optimal posted prie, r

, uniquely exists, and is haraterized by the
rst-order ondition:
Z
r

0
(v
1
; r

) dv
1
=
Z
1
r

(r

; v
2
) dv
2
:
Theorem 4. Under Assumption 7, we have
sup
 
W ( ) =W =
Z
r

v
1
=0
Z
1
v
2
=r

(v) dv
2
dv
1
:
The theorem states that the upper-bound expeted surplus an be guar-
anteed by the posted-prie mehanism with r

. Note that the posted-prie
mehanism with r

itself an be onsidered to be feasible.
18
Therefore, we
obtain the tightness of W .
Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) show that essentially any dominant-strategy
mehanism in this bilateral-trade setting is a (possibly randomized) posted-
prie mehanism. Our result says that, even if nondominant-strategy meh-
anisms are allowed, the designer would optimally hoose a (deterministi)
posted-prie mehanism if he aims to guarantee the highest possible expeted
surplus.
17
More rigorously, truth-telling is the unique admissible hoie for every type of eah
agent i exept for the threshold type v
i
= r, whih ours with probability zero under
Assumption 7.
18
For example, onsider a mehanism  

= hM

; (q

; p

)i with (i) M

i
= f0; 1g for eah
i, and (ii) (q

(m); p

(m)) = (1; r

) if m = (1; 1), and q

(m) = p

(m) = 0 otherwise. This
is feasible, and equivalent to the posted-prie mehanism with r

.
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To provide an intuition for how Assumption 7 plays a role for Theorem
4, we ask if the posted-prie mehanism with prie r

an be improved by
modifying the mehanism. Suppose some improvement was possible, for
example, in some states where v
1
< v
2
< r

(a similar argument holds for the
other ase where improvement was possible in states where v
2
> v
1
> r

).
The trading prie is neessarily less than r

, whih makes the buyer with
v
2
2 (r

; r

+ ") prefer this new outome to trading with prie r

for some
" > 0. This implies that, in the worst-ase senario, welfare loss must our
in some states where v
2
2 (r

; r

+ ") and v
1
< r

. However, under the
monotone weighted surplus in Assumption 7, this welfare loss is greater than
the welfare gain, beause this assumption basially states that allowing more
trade in states where the buyer's value is higher has a greater impat in the
expeted surplus than allowing more trade in states where the buyer's value
is lower.
Proof. For eah v
2
2 (r

; 1), dene r(v
2
) suh that
Z
r(v
2
)
0
(~v
1
; r

) d~v
1
=
Z
1
v
2
(r

; ~v
2
) d~v
2
:
Beause (v) is stritly dereasing in v
1
, stritly inreasing in v
2
, and
ontinuous, r(v
2
) uniquely exists for eah v
2
2 (r

; 1). As a funtion of v
2
, r
is stritly dereasing and dierentiable, where r
0
(v
2
)(r(v
2
); r

) =  (r

; v
2
).
Moreover, r(v
2
)! r

as v
2
# r

, and r(v
2
)! 0 as v
2
" 1.
We deompose the upper-bound problem into innitely many subprob-
lems. Speially, for eah v
2
2 (r

; 1), the subproblem v
2
is given by
W
v
2
= sup
q:V![0;1℄
Z
1
r(v
2
)
(~v
1
; v
2
)q(~v
1
; v
2
)d~v
1
+
Z
v
2
0
(r(v
2
); ~v
2
)q(r(v
2
); ~v
2
)( r
0
(v
2
))d~v
2
sub:to (v
2
  r(v
2
))q(r(v
2
); v
2
) 
Z
1
r(v
2
)
q(~v
1
; v
2
) d~v
1
+
Z
v
2
0
q(r(v
2
); ~v
2
) d~v
2
;
8v
2
2 (r

; 1)
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v1
v
2
0
1
1
r

r

v
2
r(v
2
)
Figure: r(v
2
) and the subproblem v
2
.
Lemma 6.
W 
Z
1
r

W
v
2
dv
2
:
Proof. Fix an arbitrary " > 0. By the denition of W , there exists (q
o
; p
o
) :
V ! [0; 1℄  R that satises all the onstraints of the problem of W , and
furthermore,
R
v
(v
2
  v
1
)q
o
(v)d  W   ".
For eah v
2
2 (r

; 1), q
o
satises all the onstraints of the subproblem v
2
,
beause
(v
2
  r(v
2
))q
o
(r(v
2
); v
2
) = U
1
(r(v
2
); v
2
) + U
2
(r(v
2
); v
2
)

Z
1
r(v
2
)
q
o
(~v
1
; v
2
) d~v
1
+
Z
v
2
0
q
o
(r(v
2
); ~v
2
) d~v
2
;
where the inequality is beause q
o
satises all the onstraints in the problem
of W .
Therefore,
W   "

Z
1
r

Z
1
r(v
2
)
(~v
1
; v
2
)q
o
(~v
1
; v
2
) d~v
1
dv
2
+
Z
r

0
Z
r
 1
(v
1
)
0
(v
1
; ~v
2
)q
o
(v
1
; ~v
2
) d~v
2
dv
1
=
Z
1
r

"
Z
1
r(v
2
)
(~v
1
; v
2
)q
o
(~v
1
; v
2
) d~v
1
+
Z
v
2
0
(r(v
2
); ~v
2
)q
o
(r(v
2
); ~v
2
)( r
0
(v
2
)) d~v
2
#
dv
2

Z
1
r

W
v
2
dv
2
;
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where the equality is obtained by substituting v
1
with r(v
2
).
Beause " > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain the desired inequality.
Lemma 7. For eah v
2
2 (r

; 1), we have
W
v
2
=
Z
r

r(v
2
)
(~v
1
; v
2
) d~v
1
+
Z
v
2
r

(r(v
2
); ~v
2
)( r
0
(v
2
)) d~v
2
:
Proof. In the subproblem v
2
, beause both the objetive and onstraints are
linear in eah q(v), in the solution, there exists a threshold value 

2 [0; 1℄
that satises the following. For eah ~v
2
2 (0; v
2
), we have q(r(v
2
); ~v
2
) = 1
if and only if (r(v
2
); ~v
2
)( r
0
(v
2
)) > 

. For eah ~v
1
2 (r(v
2
); 1), we have
q(~v
1
; v
2
) = 1 if and only if (~v
1
; v
2
) > 

.
Moreover, Assumption 1 implies that there exist 

1
; 

2
suh that r
0
(v
2
)(r(v
2
); 

2
) =
(

1
; v
2
), (i) q(r(v
2
); ~v
2
) = 1 if and only if ~v
2
> 

2
, and (ii) q(~v
1
; v
2
) = 1 if and
only if ~v
1
< 

1
. Furthermore, the onstraint must be satised with equality,
i.e., v
2
  r(v
2
) = (

1
  r(v
2
)) + (v
2
  

2
), or 

1
= 

2
. The only pair (

1
; 

2
)
that satises these onditions is suh that 

1
= 

2
= r

.
These lemmas imply
W 
Z
1
r

W
v
2
dv
2
=
Z
r

0
Z
1
r

(v) dv
2
dv
1
:
However, the right-hand side oinides with the worst-ase expeted sur-
plus guaranteed by the posted-prie mehanism with prie r

.
5 Conluding remarks
This paper studied the mehanism-design problem of guaranteeing desirable
performanes whenever the agents are rational in the sense of not playing
weakly dominated strategies. In Setion 3, we provided an upper bound for
the best performane guarantee among all feasible mehanisms. This upper
bound is given by the supremum of the truth-telling outome in a mehanism
where eah agent reports his own \valuation".
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Then, in Setion 4, we applied this upper bound to private-value and
interdependent-value autions and private-value bilateral trade. Under er-
tain onditions, we showed that the upper bound is tight, and obtained
the worst-ase optimal mehanisms (with a limiting argument when the ex-
at optimal mehanism is infeasible). In private-value environments, the
optimal mehanisms satisfy dominant-strategy inentive ompatibility, the
lassial notion of \robust" mehanisms. More speially, in an aution
setting, the optimal mehanism for a weighted average of expeted revenue
and surplus is a seond-prie aution (with a reserve-prie funtion) under
the monotone virtual-value ondition. In a bilateral-trade setting, the opti-
mal mehanism for expeted surplus is a posted-prie mehanism under the
monotone weighted-surplus ondition. In an interdependent-value aution,
we found that the optimal mehanism is a seond-prie aution, whih is
neither dominant-strategy nor ex post inentive ompatible, but satises the
novel inentive ompatibility introdued in the paper, whih we refer to as
inentive ompatibility for value revelation.
While we identied several environments where the upper bound is tight,
we believe that it would also be useful to provide instanes where the bound is
not tight. For example, in the bilateral-trade appliation in Setion 4.3, imag-
ine that the designer's prior  is disrete and (v) =
1
2
if v 2 f(0;
1
3
); (
2
3
; 1)g
and (v) = 0 otherwise.
19
Then, our upper bound for the highest expeted
surplus oinides with the rst-best trade surplus,
1
3
, beause, under the
rst-best trade rule q(0;
1
3
) = q(
2
3
; 1) = 1 (and q(v) = 0 otherwise), the inte-
gral envelope onditions redue to ex post individual-rationality onditions.
However, no feasible mehanism an guarantee the rst-best trade surplus.
20
19
Although  is not absolutely ontinuous in this example, the argument does not
essentially hange as long as an (absolutely ontinuous)  is lose to the one disussed
here in an appropriate sense.
20
Suppose ontrarily that a feasible mehanism hM; gi ould guarantee the rst-best
trade surplus. Then, as in Lemma 3, there exist m
1
2 M
A
1
(
2
3
) suh that m
1
is always
weakly better than m
out
for the seller with v
1
=
2
3
, m
0
1
2 M
A
1
(0) suh that m
0
1
is always
weakly better than m
1
for the seller with v
1
= 0, m
2
2 M
A
2
(
1
3
) suh that m
2
is always
29
Intuitively, the integral envelope ondition in Theorem 1 orresponds to lo-
al and downward inentive ompatibility, and therefore, a solution to the
upper-bound problem may not satisfy other onstraints suh as global inen-
tive onstraints, espeially when the solution to the upper-bound problem is
not monotoni, as in this ounterexample.
Finally, even though we foused on linear environments, some onepts
and tehniques developed in this paper may be useful in more general meha-
nism design or implementation problems. For example, for some assignment
problems with divisible goods, it may be more natural to allow for the agents'
utilities being nonlinear in q. The working paper version of this analysis,
Yamashita (2013a), establishes a similar upper bound as in Theorem 1 (or
Corollary 1) in suh a nonlinear environment but with private values. As
another example, for some mehanism-design problems without monetary
transfers, dominant-strategy inentive-ompatible (or strategy-proof) meh-
anisms are examined in the literature in private-value environments.
21
The
ounterpart of inentive ompatibility for value revelation (or more gener-
ally \preferene revelation") may naturally be dened in those problems but
with interdependene. It may be interesting to see whether mehanisms that
satisfy suh inentive onditions perform well. One of the hallenges would
be to extend our upper-bound result to more general environments, whih is
left for future researh.
weakly better than m
out
for the buyer with v
2
=
1
3
, and m
0
2
2 M
A
2
(1) suh that m
0
2
is always weakly better than m
2
for the buyer with v
2
= 1. These neessarily imply
g(m
1
;m
2
) = (0; 0), g(m
0
1
;m
2
) = (1; p
1
) with p
1

1
3
, g(m
1
;m
0
2
) = (1; p
2
) with p
2

2
3
, and
g(m
0
1
;m
0
2
) = (q; p) for some (q; p) suh that p 2 [p
2
; q+p
1
 1℄. However, q+p
1
 1 
1
3
< p
2
,
and therefore, suh a mehanism annot exist.
21
See, for example, Moulin (1980) for single-peaked voting problems, and Gale and
Shapley (1962), Dubins and Freedman (1981), and Roth (1982) for mathing problems.
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